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Abstract 
The current invocation of Darwin in accounting research is not matched to the earliest 
invocations of Darwinism in accounting and economics. The study has two 
objectives: to document the change from Darwinism meaning ‘the scientific method” 
to Darwinism meaning “survival of the fittest”; and secondly to describe Lamarckism 
as the more correct descriptor of cultural evolution than Darwinism. Lamarckism 
deserves to be better recognized as providing the correct understanding of the 
evolutionary drivers to selective, purposive, adaptive, and deterministic evolution by 
our markets, institutions, or firms.  
 
Introduction 
It is one hundred and forty seven years since publication of The Origin of Species by 
Charles Darwin (1859); the book itself was a slender volume, but both the intellectual 
scholarship and the intellectual legacy from this publication continues to influence 
nearly all of academic enquiry. Accounting and economics research has not been left 
out, nor should it be. For it was from economics that Darwin developed his models of 
diversity. As a heavy investor in industry shares, it was the industrial progress of the 
nineteenth century that inspired Darwin’s idea of mechanisms to create diversity 
(Desmond and Moore, 1991: 420). In common with Herbert Spencer (a railway 
surveyor), such men appreciated division of labour and specialisation; “the industrial 
metaphor seemed to stretch to nature herself” (ibid: 420). Spencer went on to develop 
the concept of “Social Darwinism,” still influential at an academic level and 
inescapable at a popular level. In the 1850s, the creation of wealth and the production 
of species were considered to obey similar laws (ibid: 420).  
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But can the resultant theories of the origin of biological species by Charles Darwin 
and others then be applied to the evolution of wealth, corporates, and industry? Unlike 
organisms, human artefacts such as markets, institutions or labour forces are not 
limited by structural consideration to a restricted range of opportunistic activities or 
choices. They neither procreate in their likeness nor die. The source of variation in 
individual organisms is not paralleled in the sources of variation and diversity in the 
range of human artefacts subject to inquiry by economists.  
It is proposed that discourse with the objective of the construction of a clear 
understanding of mechanisms and drivers behind survival or failure of economic 
activities should turn away from reputable “Darwinism”, and instead give due credit 
to the distinctive nature of the processes of cultural evolution, Lamarckian in 
character. There have in the past been articles that utilise Darwinism, as in the 
scholarship of Frank Birkin and his colleagues. As they noted, “the Darwinism 
concept of survival of the fittest provides little reason for the accountant to consider 
anything larger than the individual firm” (1997). However, there has been no detailed 
attention to what how term Darwinism has metamorphosed over the last one hundred 
years of scholarship in accounting and economics research. 
Previous research, has, however, provided readers with an erudite and clearly argued 
appreciation of different facets of Marxism. Like a stone cut with many facets, readers 
of Marx find within his writings multiple theoretical underpinnings for research and 
analysis, irrespective of whether or not Marx himself would recognise the use of his 
theoretical writings his legacy to Western philosophy. It is thus possible to identify 
simultaneous writers as a ‘Type A’ or ‘Type B’ Marxists. As documented by Tinker 
(1999), these multiple perspectives occur in accounting literature concurrently. Tinker 
further describes accounting research as being disabled by using what appear to be 
only caricatures of Marxism (1999, p. 663), and his 1999 analysis offers readers a 
deeper understanding well beyond caricature. 
This research is offered in order to match such analysis of Marxism. However, in a 
manner distinctly different to Marxism, Darwinism may well be part of a pervasive 
undercurrent to Western thought, but it is a part that periodically surfaces, like 
Proteus, with a completely different appearance. Therefore those invoking Darwinism 
in any one period are perceived as one genre only, albeit with variations. But the 
genre itself has changed radically over the last century. The Darwinism currently 
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recognised is described as follows: “Those parts of Darwin’s theory that are relevant 
to accountancy are: 
• Evolution from primitive beginnings to the “latest” organisations of increasing 
complexity 
• Incremental processes of change governed by painstakingly slow processes of 
trial and error, and 
• Emphasis on the specialised adaptation of individuals at least isolated from, if 
not struggling with, the larger environment.” (Birkin et al 1997) 
However, such an understanding of Darwin’s theory was not matched in the earliest 
invocations of Darwininsm in accounting and economics. It is the first objective of 
this study to document the change from Darwinism meaning ‘the scientific method” 
to Darwinism meaning “survival of the fittest.” The second objective is to describe 
Lamarckism as the more correct descriptor of culture evolution than Darwinism. A 
more exact use of such terms in theoretical analysis would also describe more exactly 
the type of evolutionary mechanisms being invoked. 
 
DARWINISM, LAMARCKISM, AND SOCIAL DARWINISM 
There has been much scholarship concerning the distinction between Darwinist, 
Lamarckian, and Social Darwinist theories. When Darwinism is applied to human 
endeavour it is more correct to title the descriptor as Social Darwinism or 
Lamarckism. 
Social Darwinism  
Social Darwinism was the theory of social evolution developed by Herbert Spencer 
before Darwin's scholarship. The evolution of societies, the creation of wealth and the 
production of species were all considered by Spencer to obey similar laws (Desmond 
& Moore, 1991: 420). It was Spencer who termed the phrase: “survival of the fittest”. 
Darwin borrowed this phrase in the fifth edition of The Origin of Species; in turn, 
Spencer seized on Darwin's syntheses to bolster his philosophy (Graham, 1999: 23). It 
has a poor reputation now compared with Darwinism, and Bowler expressed concerns 
that the oversimplified notion of Social Darwinism has stood in the way of efforts to 
develop a better understanding of changes in society (Bowler, 1995: 111). Although 
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Darwin’s theory reflected an ideology of laissez-faire individualism, the same can be 
said of Spencer's Social Darwinism, which Bowler prefers to call Spencerian 
Lamarckism. 
Lamarckism 
Jean-Baptiste Lamarck’s contributions were developed in the first two decades of the 
nineteenth century; his last major exposition was in 1815, long before Spencer or 
Darwin. His theory advocated two factors in the process of organic change: 
• the natural progress of organic development; and 
• the modification of such progress by constraining circumstances (Burkhardt, 
1977: 154). 
It is also of note that the inheritance of acquired characteristics did not originate with 
Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, and initially he did not advocate such a mechanism. However, 
as his ideas developed it became a fundamental tenet of “Lamarckian” theories of 
organic change. Lamarckism can be summarised as the inheritance of acquired 
characters; in a changing environment, a set of habits could be a spur to adaptation, 
based on the doctrine of use and disuse. Lamarckism came to be understood as a 
theory of directed evolution: variation originates preferentially in adaptive directions. 
Although much scholarship has identified that evolution in human society has all the 
hallmarks of Lamarckism, rather than Darwinian evolution, the debate on the correct 
evolutionary mechanism is not so significant in the context of this research. Both 
Darwinism and Lamarckism embrace the belief that progress is achieved as a result of 
the “struggle for existence” and this metaphor transcends the debate concerning the 
correct invocation of an evolutionary mechanism for cultural and social evolution 
(Bowler, 1995: 110). 
So by whatever name, this metaphor invokes the struggle for existence. Earlier 
references to Darwinism, however, were used as a metaphor for the scientific method.  
The Origin of ‘Darwinism’ and Veblen’s Scholarship 
To untangle both the source and status of Darwinism as a reputable icon of 
evolutionary processes in evolutionary economics and accounting, let us turn to one 
of the significant early theorists in evolutionary economics by examining Thorstein 
Veblen’s invocation of Darwinism. Veblen was an early advocate of the Darwinian 
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approach. However, Veblen did not espouse that there was a dynamic in economic 
change that paralleled biological evolutionary change. Veblen advocated a Darwinian 
approach, as to him, Darwin’s method of scientific inquiry was an exemplar for 
economics.  
Veblen had considered at length the status of inquiry by economic scholars at the turn 
of the century. In his 1898 essay on “Why is economics not an evolutionary science” 
Veblen argued for the development of a close-knit body of theory, based on 
evaluation of facts with a scientific impartiality (republ. 1990: 58-60). He did not 
discuss Darwinian theory; but only chided the Historical School in classical 
economics for following the lines of pre-Darwinian speculation (ibid: 72). Veblen 
advocated approaching a question on the Darwinian basis of cause and effect, and 
analysis in terms of habit and response to stimuli (1990: 443).  
In a 1936 reprint of Veblen’s writings, Mitchell’s introduction described Veblen as a 
good Darwinian in respect of making only slight use of measurements, and mainly 
utilising qualitative analysis (Mitchell, 1936: xxx). Mitchell described Veblen as 
having moulded his notions of human nature on Darwin, William James, and 
anthropological studies (ibid: xxvi), and his basic criticism of economics was that the 
prevailing concepts and methods of inquiry were pre-Darwinian (ibid: xxiii). None of 
this discussion of Veblen, and his advocacy of the Darwinian method, referred to 
evolutionary processes that were adaptive, progressive, or deterministic. Indeed, in 
1936 Mitchell described the Darwinian approach as advocated by Veblen, being 
characterised by: 
• blindly cumulative causation, in which there is no final term, no consummation;  
• a less metaphysical approach (ibid: xlviii); and 
• a speculative system uniting a vast range of observations into a thoroughly 
consistent whole (ibid: xxxvi). 
Referring to Veblen, Mitchell described that: 
“Having climbed to Darwin’s mountain peak, his eyes ranged over a vast 
stretch of human experience. About many matters quite invisible to 
economists immersed in the 19th century he thought intensively” (1936: xxxii). 
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However, over the next fifty years, the meaning of the term Darwinism appeared to 
shift and by the time Simich and Tilman prepared their 1985 reference guide to 
studies of Veblen’s contribution to economics, there were references to more than 
twenty studies most of which described that Veblen was emphatically and 
fundamentally a Darwinian, and that Veblen introduced Darwinian evolutionary 
analysis into economics. In the midst of these studies were a few in the 1940s and 
1950s describing Veblen’s Darwinism as a façade; that Veblen misunderstood 
Darwinian evolution. However, these studies did not undermine an increasingly 
strident invocation of Darwinian evolution as providing mechanisms describing 
evolution in economics. For example, the introduction to the 1990 reprint of Veblen’s 
writings, W. J. Samuels described Veblen as adopting a “Darwinian conception of 
change as an unfolding sequence without necessary ultimate meaning” (1990: xiii). 
Post-Darwinian science focused on the process of causation, and Veblen advocated an 
evolutionary science of economics that was based on theories of cultural growth as 
determined by economic interest, i.e. cumulation, variation, and selection (1990: xiv). 
In Tilman’s review of the contribution by Veblen to the development of economic 
theory, he reviewed Veblen’s Darwinism versus Critical School Dialectics, suggesting 
that the scholars such as Marcus, Horkheimer, and Adorno viewed Veblen’s roots 
lying in American pragmatism, a major weakness of which was reliance on the natural 
sciences as models for philosophical analyses. Adorno suggested that “the concept of 
adaptation is the deus ex machina through which Veblen tried to bridge the gap 
between what is and what ought to be” (Tilman, 1991: 191); and Veblen’s adamant 
commitment to Darwinian empiricism meant that for Veblen, “all social change is the 
result of mere animal-like adaptation, devoid of conscious decision making 
concerning means and ends” (ibid 1991: 191). 
Veblen’s failure to make policy recommendations was “logically consistent with his 
evolutionary, Darwinian perspective that saw the instrumentally adaptive efforts of 
the community always falling short of what was needed, since institutional reforms 
would be obsolete by the time they could be implemented” (Tilman, 1991: 264). 
However, in Rutherford’s review of Tilman’s magnum opus of the intellectual legacy 
of Veblen, he claimed Veblen’s use of an analogy to natural selection is closer to a 
Lamarckian process than a Darwinian one; but Rutherford suggested that Veblen was 
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not a Lamarckian, in that he denied acquired traits would become instinctive, and also 
denied existing instincts could be lost. The source of this claim is not clear. 
Was Veblen the only founding father in economics who could have been the source of 
the utilisation of Darwinism as the mechanism of evolution during change? Some 
authors have also suggested that Schumpeter’s contribution to the development of 
economic theory showed the usefulness of Darwinian theory for economics, and “the 
precise nature of evolutionary forces at work in economic systems” (Kelm, 1977). 
This claim remains contentious. Hodgson (1997) believed that Schumpeter rejected 
biological metaphors and analogies, and Schumpeter was not a “Darwinian”. 
Darwin was later invoked in the accounting discipline. This was part of an advocacy 
of the scientific method for a young discipline, in a manner parallel to Veblen's 
references. This occurred as part of a debate in the 1940's and 1950's concerning the 
adoption of scientific methodology for accounting, not only in research but in 
accounting practice, typified by Edward Stamp’s essay “Why can accounting not 
become a science like physics?” (1981). Earlier Stamp had noted: “I do believe that it 
will be possible to achieve uniformity of theoretical and conceptual foundations in 
much the same way that Darwin and his successors have been able to bring order out 
of chaos in the life sciences. We must bear in mind however, that accountancy and 
economics deal with states of mind as well as states of nature, and this makes it harder 
for the accountants to find common ground between different points in time and space 
than it is for the biologist, let alone the physicist” (1972: 64). 
In these two disciplines, there was a dominating metaphor of a mechanistic 
explanation for their subject matter. Economics, business organisations, and capital 
markets were considered to operate as machines: inputs and outputs, controls and 
regulators. There was no Darwinist metaphor of a struggle for survival in the writings 
of Veblen or Stamp. It was only later in these disciplines that the mechanistic 
metaphor was replaced by a biological one (Hodgson, 1995: 315).  
In addition to the different perspectives on such a fundamental issue is the 
significance of the implicit adoption of Darwinian evolutionary mechanisms by such 
writers. The paleontologist Stephen J. Gould stated emphatically his reticence to 
invoke any analogies between a cultural episode and biological evolution; as such 
comparisons had done vastly more harm than good (1991: 63). “Biological evolution 
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is a bad analogue for cultural change, because the two systems are so different for 
three major reasons that could hardly be more fundamental” (1991: 65). These are that 
cultural evolution is significantly faster; secondly, cultural evolution is direct and 
Lamarckian in form; and thirdly, the basic topologies of biological and cultural 
change are completely different.  
As an evolutionary biologist, Gould felt no hesitation in prescribing cultural evolution 
as Lamarckian in character, and had also oft expounded on Lamarck’s contribution to 
biology as a respected systematist (1980(a): 171, 1983: 378, 1985: 36). For example, 
Gould credits that Lamarck was correct in speculating that small inconspicuous 
oceanic species should be immune from extinction (1993: 55), and Lamarck also 
made a significant contribution in recognising that a change in behaviour must 
precede alteration of form (1985: 36). It is not of concern in this context as to the 
quality or standing of Lamarck’s contribution to biological theories, but Gould’s 
advocacy that cultural evolution is direct and Lamarckian in form deserves further 
examination and elaboration. 
What are “Lamarckian” evolutionary mechanisms? 
Jean-Baptiste Lamarck’s contributions were developed in the first two decades of the 
nineteenth century; his last major exposition was in 1815. Fundamental to his writings 
was his belief that only by studying nature would it be possible to learn the method 
the Creator used to bring living things into existence. There was no mechanism in 
these theories for the origins of species, as he granted that nothing came into existence 
except by divine will, by whatever method the Creator wished (Burkhardt, 1977: 
184). This fundamental tenet of his philosophy contributed to some of the loss of 
popularity of his theories in the latter part of the nineteenth century, as debates were at 
times polarized between Church and Science.  
His theories advocated two factors in the process of organic change: 
• the natural progress of organic development; and 
• The modification of such progress by constraining circumstances (Burkhardt, 
1977: 145). 
This separation into two processes was common to a number of 18th century theorists. 
It is also of note that the inheritance of acquired characteristics did not originate with 
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Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, and in his day he initially did not advocate it. However, as his 
theories developed it became a fundamental tenet of “Lamarckian” mechanisms of 
organic change. Thus the second of the two factors listed above was later represented 
as the process whereby for what was habit for one generation became instinct for later 
generations, i.e. the inheritance of acquired characters. The most common examples 
cited were the absence of teeth in the whale and anteater, the rudimentary eyes of a 
mole, and the absence of legs on a snake. Equally, the frequent use of an organ 
strengthens and augments its capacities e.g. long necks or long tongues of certain 
animals, and the hind limbs of a kangaroo. However, he did not attribute this to 
consciously purposive responses by organisms. With respect to biological evolution, 
Hull noted: 
“present-day readers are likely to view a belief in Lamarckian modes of 
inheritance as not only mistaken but also unscientific. Mistaken, though 
justified, it surely was. Unscientific it was not” (Hull 1989: 217). 
Lamarckism came to be understood as a theory of directed evolution (variation 
originates preferentially in adaptive directions). Eventually it was from much 
application and debate following Darwin’s theories on the origins of species which 
undermined the purposive, deterministic and progressive attributes of evolution 
concomitant with Lamarckism. This did not happen overnight. Indeed, Charles 
Darwin had paid considerable attention to the breadth of Lamarck’s scholarship in the 
formulation of his ideas, and his theories did not exclude some of Lamarck’s ideas 
(Hull, 1989: 60). Darwinism had gone through many transformations, and it was only 
by Weismann’s much later influence that Lamarckism was expelled from Darwinism, 
and the understanding and application of the principles of natural selection dominated 
the biological sciences (Hull 1989: 235).  
From scholarship of philosophical biologists, there has been much further discussion 
concerning: the incorrect attribution of the theories described as “Darwinism” to 
Darwin (Hull, 1989: 236, 268, 295) and “Lamarckism” to Lamarck (Gould, 1980(b): 
65). These will not be further addressed, but it is an issue which has been raised in 
part of the critique of Nelson and Winter’s advocacy of Lamarckism: that their 
representation of it was not what Lamarck originally theorized (Vromen, 195: 115). 
That debate fairly rests in the realm of philosophers of biology. It is more constructive 
to go with the common understanding of Lamarckism as described, and to further 
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review its pertinence to the mechanisms of and drivers to change in economics. The 
common understanding of Lamarckism is summarised by two descriptors: that 
• variation originates preferentially in adaptive directions; and 
• what is habit for one generation becomes instinct for later generations, i.e. the 
inheritance of acquired characters. 
The preference for Darwinism over Lamarckism in economic theories is reflected 
more generally in the preferences of social scientists of many and various persuasions.  
That Lamarck’s status as a reputable icon has been lost is not surprising. Lamarck’s 
ideas were so thoroughly caricatured, and associated with both the belief in an 
omnipotent Creator and fraudulent scientific experiment in the nineteenth century, 
that his ideas are unlikely to ever enjoy resurgence in biology. Gould was aware of the 
disparaged status of Lamarck as one of the evolutionary fathers. He noted that 
Lamarck suffers from “an imposed reputation as a loser not to be taken seriously for 
any of his ideas” (1985: 36), In spite of this he continued to advocate the adoption of 
Lamarckism as providing the correct mechanism for cultural, thus economic, 
evolution. He uses the term in the manner in which it is commonly understood: that 
Lamarckism as a theory of directed evolution (variation originates preferentially in 
adaptive directions) and as such provides the appropriate modeling of mechanisms for 
evolution of human artefacts and institutions.  
The Critique of Lamarckism in Economic Theory  
Darwinian evolution is epitomised in mottos such as natural selection, fitness, 
survival of the fittest, and adaptation. An example of the utilisation of Darwinism can 
be found in theories of the firm, as in Vromen’s examination of “survival of the 
fittest” as a useful tautology, along with “agency costs are minimised”, as the building 
blocks for creating a theory of organisation. (Vromen, 1995: 51). One assumption is 
that a prevailing type of organisation is common because it has proven its efficiency 
in “survival processes” in competitive markets (ibid: 56). 
Such prevalent ideas have been subject to a critique by Nelson and Winter (1982). 
They argued that there are other evolutionary mechanisms and that their evolutionary 
theory is ‘unabashedly Lamarckian’. Vromen provides further detailed synopsis of the 
Darwinian theory of natural selection, separating into the three mechanisms of 
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selection inheritance and mutation, and he makes a detailed critique of Nelson and 
Winter’s advocacy of a Lamarckian theory. Vromen eventually argues that Nelson 
and Winter’s claim to be unabashedly Lamarckian would be better represented as a 
dualism in evolutionary theory, seeing both natural selection and adaptive learning as 
two mechanisms both operating in economic change (1995: 27, 205). 
But in discussing the impact of Darwin’s theory, Vromen saw some overlap in the 
two approaches: “many economists have been inspired by Darwinian (and 
Lamarckian) evolutionary theory” (Vromen, 1995: 5). Furthermore, Vromen 
examined Gould’s representation of biological versus cultural evolution and Gould’s 
arguments that cultural evolution operates in the ‘Lamarckian” mode. Vromen then 
opened up Dawkin’s “Selfish Gene” arguments and its relationship to evolutionary 
game theory (1995: 156). His concern with the units of selection is important, because 
evolutionary economics can be approached from the perspective of evolutionary 
holism or evolutionary atomism; the correct identification of the implicit level at 
which selection is assumed to operate is important in evolutionary debate (Watkins, 
1998). However, Vromen did not further expand on the significance of Gould’s 
description of human evolution being cultural, not biological, in nature. This example 
of Vromen’s advocacy of Darwinian principles, and his critique of Lamarckian 
theory, may be typical of the continuing loyalty to Darwin by economic theorists. 
Darwin has been lifted to a rarefied level in iconography, whereas Lamarck 
languishes in oblivion.  
As already described, Veblen and Stamp were not concerned with Lamarckian or 
Darwinian processes; “Darwinism” equated with a “scientific” method based on 
extensive observation of data and an appreciation of the merits of a qualitative 
approach. It was an objective of this paper to draw attention to the distinction between 
these two modus operandi, and that the casual invocation of Darwinism rampant in 
research addressing issues in evolutionary economics and accounting research might 
be lessened.  
Conclusion 
Tinker argued that the legacy of Marxism is not a definitive analysis of a particular 
period of capitalist development, but “a methodology of immense versatility” (1999, 
p. 663). The same appears in this description of the character of Darwinism. 
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“Darwin’s evolutionary theory is an example of an inner logic that has wide cultural 
influence” (Birkin et al 1997), but the significance of its invocation has changed 
radically. At the start of last century Darwinism was the hallmark of a scientific 
method. There was no consensus that human artefacts and institutions should show 
adaptive behaviour in the manner of the earthworm or the orchid. By the end of the 
last century Darwinism is the rubric of cultural or social evolutionary processes far 
removed from the manner in which Darwinism is applied in biological studies. Based 
on differential survival of the most fit, it is observed that those cultures, human 
artifacts or social processes which survive show essential characteristics of fitness. 
The behavior of the most successful is seen as being opportunistically adaptive during 
environmental change. 
The founding theorists of evolutionary economics did not consider Lamarckian versus 
Darwinian processes, nor did they endorse biological analogies for market 
mechanisms. Veblen and Stamp had advocated the evolutionary approach, in so far as 
“evolutionary” was intended to imply the scientific “matter-of-fact” approach. 
Similarly, Marshall had advocated dynamic analysis based on biological conceptions 
(Vromen, 1995: 2). 
In the current surge of activity in accounting, management and economics research 
examining processes by which institutions evolve, it will be necessary to develop 
theories on the basis that institutions are human artefacts, subject to evolutionary 
processes characteristic of cultural evolution. These evolutionary processes and 
mechanisms are Lamarckian, not Darwinian, in nature. Lamarckian mechanisms 
incorporate the capacity of the institution, the firm, or the market to not only grow and 
expand incorporating characteristics acquired since its establishment, but also that the 
evolutionary changes can accumulate and accelerate in a deterministic, progressive 
and purposive direction. It is a model of evolutionary change closer to our hopes and 
aspirations.  
Charles Darwin himself drew optimism from the achievements of industry last 
century, but his theories of the mechanisms of biological evolution allowed no such 
optimism of purpose, progress or self-determination in organic evolution. But 
Lamarckism allows hope for the survival of the human species, of each culture or 
ethnicity, and the survival of our knowledge and industry. As noted by Gould in his 
1996 epilogue on human culture, the “uniquely and distinctively Lamarckian style of 
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human cultural inheritance gives our technological history a directional and 
cumulative character that no natural Darwinian evolution can possess” (1996; 222). 
Accounting is a cultural, rather than a biological, discipline in nature. Accounting 
events and institutions are human artefacts, and theories in accounting subject to 
assessment on the basis of being cultural, rather than biological, events, or processes. 
Our favored metaphors and analogies in accounting textbooks are like the QWERTY 
keyboard, they retain their popularity due to various preferences of previous 
generations of textbook writers, thus are inherited by each new generation of scholars. 
The consensus on the appropriateness of the application of Darwinism to accounting 
or economics is understood by each new generation of scholars, but Lamarckism 
deserves to be better recognized as providing the correct understanding of the 
evolutionary drivers to selective, purposive, adaptive, and deterministic evolution by 
our markets, institutions, or firms. 
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